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MEASURING RELIABILITY IN THE WARTIME
TRANSPORT OF PROVISIONS: THE CASE OF
MAO YUANYI (1594–1641)
MASATO HASEGAWA
Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Berlin, Germany
A military strategist and advisor, Mao Yuanyi (1594–1641) was one of the most
prolific writers of the late Ming period on military matters and participated in the
Ming war against the Jurchen in Liaodong in the early seventeenth century. In his
seminal study on the conduct of war, the Records of Military Preparedness
(Wubeizhi), he exhaustively discussed the costs and benefits of the transport
methods available at the time, including carts, pack animals, and water transport.
Among all the transport methods that he considered, Mao clearly favored what he
called “human transport” (renyun), which exclusively relied on the labor of
human bearers. By drawing on Mao’s writings on the transport of provisions, this
study analyzes his forceful argument in favor of employing human labor and illumi-
nates the practices of organizing wartime logistics. It also sheds light on the manner
in which the costs and benefits of transport methods were being evaluated and how
the notions of efficiency and reliability came into play in calculations concerning
transport in the late Ming period.
KEYWORDS: Mao Yuanyi, late Ming military logistics, Liaodong, technology, human
labor, reliability
INTRODUCTION
When we peruse scholarly writings of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century China on
military matters, we often encounter extensive discussions of logistical and provision-
ing challenges.1 Whenever a military conflict erupted, the task of provisioning troops
inescapably confronted those who found themselves—willingly or otherwise—in the
position of planning and overseeing military campaigns. While their careful planning
was essential to transporting provisions successfully, of even greater importance was
to coordinate the work of countless seamen, bearers, carters, and animals, who shoul-
dered the physical burden of the transport efforts. Among them, according to lateMing
sources, human bearers in particular played a critical role in military transport. During
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the Japanese invasion of Korea (1592–1598), for instance, a Ming official was
instructed to transport grain for Ming troops who had been deployed to fight
against the Japanese by reassigning 10,000 soldiers unfit for combat, with 200 men
positioned in every ten li 里 (5.8 km) to cover a total distance of 500 li (288 km).2
Meanwhile, for the purpose of transporting provisions, Chosŏn officials received
royal approval for implementing a method of mobilizing local men and monk soldiers.
Under thismethod, captains were designated in each unit of tenmen, and to each group
of 200men were assigned supervising officials.3 In both of these cases, the sources refer
to a “method” (Ch. fa, Kr. pŏp法) or “principle” (Ch. zhi, Kr. che制) of mobilizing a
large number of humans for military transport, indicating that there existed precedents
of and established ideas about using human labor for transport. During the late Ming
period, perhaps no one studied such use of human labor more methodically than Mao
Yuanyi茅元儀 (1594-ca. 1641), who read avidly the military treatises of the past from
an early age. Mao’s erudition in military matters was noticed by the Ming scholar-
general Sun Chengzong孫承宗 (1563–1638), and Mao later served as an advisor to
Sun, who as Minister of War and a Grand Secretary effectively stalled the advance
of the Jurchen troops in Liaodong during the Tianqi 天啓 reign (1621–1627), and
again during the early years of the Chongzhen崇禎 reign (1628–1644).4
Mao Yuanyi wrote prolifically and left behind a voluminous body of works on mili-
tary tactics, strategies, and logistics. For Mao, theoretical knowledge of military
matters appears to have carried little meaning unless it could be implemented in prac-
tice. When in 1628 Mao presented to the recently enthroned Chongzhen emperor (r.
1627–1644) his monumental 240-fascicle (juan 卷) work on military affairs titled
Records of Military Preparedness (Wubeizhi 武備志),5 his earnest hope was likely
that the young nineteen-year-old emperor would instantly recognize his book’s practi-
cal value in light of the escalating war against the Jurchen.6 Mao’s Records of Military
Preparedness, which has been deemed “probably the most comprehensive Chinese
military compendium ever written,”7 not only amply displays his exhaustive knowl-
edge of past military campaigns. It also exhibits his extensive familiarity with military
logistics and the latest developments in science and technology, including Western irri-
gation techniques and firearms. Devoting fifty-five fascicles, or over one-fifth of the
entire volume,Mao carefully examined a vast array of logistical issues such as encamp-
ing, handling of firearms, and—perhaps most importantly for keeping morale among
the ranks of ordinary soldiers—provisioning troops during military campaigns.
This study examines Mao Yuanyi’s notions of efficiency and reliability in military
logistics by juxtaposing the Records of Military Preparednesswith some of his other
writings which he produced in the early seventeenth century. Mao’s careful assess-
ments of available transport methods and his formidable argument in favor of
relying on human labor offer invaluable insights into the manner in which advan-
tages and disadvantages of disparate transport methods were evaluated and com-
pared in early seventeenth-century China. The existing scholarship on science and
technology in China has called our attention to the sophistication of China’s mech-
anical devices and to inventions driven by the need for efficiency. In examining the
mechanical structure of wheelbarrows described in early Chinese texts, for example,
Joseph Needham and Wang Ling concluded that the “essence of the invention was
economical.” “In the wheelbarrow,” added Needham and Wang, “we have an out-
standing example of those many facts which undermine, and indeed overthrow,
the classical European stereotype of China as a civilisation with unlimited man-
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power incapable of inventing and adopting labour-saving devices.”8 The role that
such labor-saving innovations historically played in economic development in
China has been closely debated in the so-called “Great Divergence” debate on the
relative productivity of the Chinese economy in the early modern and modern
periods.9 For instance, in assessing the structure of the rural economy in the
Yantze delta region, Philip Huang emphasized that the “vast farm-labor supply
removed incentives for labor-saving capitalization and dictated that change take
the direction of labor-intensifying involution.”10 Meanwhile, Kenneth Pomeranz
has argued that China and Western Europe were similarly on “a labor-intensive
path” until the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when, according to Pomer-
anz, the use of fossil fuels and access to New World resources in Western Europe
“obviated the need to manage land intensively.”11 However, previous studies on rela-
tive productivity in China have rarely considered the manner in which human labor
was compared with labor-saving devices or technologies in the late Ming period.
How was the notion of saving labor discussed and implemented? How were priori-
ties and preferences identified and established? Inquiry into these questions also
requires us to examine the availability and cost of human labor in late Ming
society.12 This study’s analysis centers on an argument put forward by Mao
Yuanyi. But Mao’s argument for the labor-intensive method of human transport
not only illuminates the practices of organizing logistics during wartime. It also
sheds light on the manner in which the costs and benefits of transport methods
were being evaluated and how the notions of efficiency and reliability came into
play in calculations concerning transport in the late Ming period.
MODES OF TRANSPORT IN THE RECORDS OF MILITARY PREPAREDNESS
AsMao Yuanyi opened his section on military logistics in hisRecords of Military Pre-
paredness, he almost immediately struck a cautious note and alerted the reader that
the realities of war did not always allow a swift transport of supplies and provisions:
Since ancient times, we have sought to make sure that when armies march,
provisions follow. However, when provisions must be transported a thousand
li (576 km), the soldiers [already] have a hungry look.13 Therefore, if war
continues over an extended period, nothing is more beneficial than military
colony farming (tuntian 屯田). If we are to open up wasteland, we cannot
avoid discussing the matter of farming. Those who discuss farming attach
great importance to enhancing the natural advantages of the land with
human labor. A single achievement can yield twice as many profits. If military
colony farming becomes constant, experienced farmers should be consulted.14
Focusing on the methods of military colony farming, Mao then examined the his-
torical precedents of military colony farming. Military colony farming was an
ancient form of provisioning troops, and soldiers were expected to work the land
when there was no military engagement. As one of the earliest references to military
colony farming, Mao cited aWarring States text and wrote that “[people] farmed for
three seasons and learned military skills for one season.”15 While emphasizing the
historical roots of military colony farming, Mao was also keenly aware that much
had changed since ancient times, most especially in the area of irrigation techniques.
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Mao detailed the irrigation techniques of drawing water from rivers, wells, and rain
and snow by citing an illustrated work on irrigation titled Western Methods of
Hydraulics (Taixi shuifa 泰西水法), produced at the beginning of the seventeenth
century by the Jesuit missionary Sabatino de Ursis (1575–1620) with the collabor-
ation of Xu Guangqi徐光啓 (1562–1633).16 Mao did not provide much commen-
tary on the text itself. But he noted that the sections and illustrations he included—
roughly three quarters of Ursis’s work—were selectively chosen as they “can be of
assistance to military colony farming.”17 He closed the section on military colony
farming and irrigation techniques by quoting passages on water-powered mills
from Wang Zhen’s 王禎 Agricultural Treatise (Nongshu 農書), a widely consulted
fourteenth-century work on agriculture and sericulture. While Wang Zhen’s treatise
contrasted dryland farming in the north with irrigated farming in the south,18 such a
distinction is not emphasized in this section of the Records of Military Preparedness.
But Mao’s choice of treatises to be included in this section not only highlights the
extent of agricultural knowledge that can be amassed by studying printed materials
available in the late Ming period. It also underscores, in Mao’s view, the importance
of agricultural knowledge in administering military logistics.
Judging from the manner in which Mao introduced the subject of military colony
farming, he appears to have believed that the ultimate objective of implementing
military colony farming was to prevent hunger among soldiers in distant places
and obviate the need to transport provisions over a long distance. At the same
time, he acknowledged that success in implementing military colony farming did
not completely eliminate the need for transporting provisions. In order to provision
large contingents of soldiers and animals on the move, gathered crops still had to be
sent to distant encampments, and military colony farming could only be a partial
solution. Furthermore, while one had to wait for a certain period before being
able to harvest crops from the cultivated land, soldiers and animals could not
subsist without food and water for a protracted period. In the absence of logistical
support, soldiers and animals were left to live off the land, which often created more
problems than it solved. Although Mao did not explicitly explain why he chose to
exhaustively discuss transport methods in the Records of Military Preparedness,
perhaps his underlying assumption was that the transport of provisions was an ines-
capable component of the warfare of his time.
Shifting his focus from military colony farming to the challenge of provisioning
soldiers on the move, Mao then characterized the deployment of armies, large
and small, as follows:
If small armies march far, it is inevitable that we support them by transporting
provisions. If large armies suddenly congregate, it is also inevitable that we
support them by transporting provisions. There are only two types of trans-
port: water and overland transport. Water transport consists of canal and
sea transport, while overland transport consists of cart, mounted, and
human transport.19
Mao’s breakdown of military transport offers helpful hints about his structural
understanding of the transport of provisions. It allows us to understand how
Mao, one of the foremost experts on military matters of his time, conceptualized
and differentiated various means of transport on waterways, by sea, and across land.
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RIVER AND SEA TRANSPORT (HECAO 河漕, HAIYUN海運)
While Mao chose to examine canal and sea transport in the Records of Military Pre-
paredness, his discussions primarily described existing navigation routes without
offering extensive commentary. He also drew almost exclusively on earlier works
on waterways and sea lanes. As he discussed river and canal transport, for
example, Mao entirely relied on the work of Pan Jixun 潘季馴 (1521–1595), “the
foremost hydraulic engineer of Ming times,”20 who detailed the course of the
Yellow River from its purported source in the mythological Kunlun Mountain to
the mouth of the River in today’s Zhejiang province.21 In the section on sea trans-
port, on the other hand, Mao relied on the illustrated geographical survey of the
Ming realm by Luo Hongxian 羅洪先 (1504–1564), who in turn had based his
work on an earlier geographical study by the Yuan-dynasty scholar Zhu Siben 朱
思本.22 In the Records of Military Preparedness, Mao introduced the four sea
lanes described by Luo (see Figures 1 and 2). The first route takes the reader from
Fuzhou 福州 in Fujian province to the coastal area near Jinghai Guard 靖海衛 on
the southeastern tip of the Shandong peninsula. Second, one sails from Liujiagang
劉家港 near today’s Shanghai to the wharf of Nuizhuang 牛壯 along the Sancha
River 三叉河, the downstream of the Liao River 遼河 in today’s Liaoning
FIG. 1. Map of ports accompanying the text on sea transport in Mao Yuanyi’s Records of
Military Preparedness (Wubeizhi). This map views the Shandong peninsula (in the middle)
from the east with the north facing the right of the page. Chosŏn Korea and the Yalu River
appear in the lower right corner, and Huai’an prefecture and the Yellow River are depicted
in the top left corner. (Mao Yuanyi, Wubeizhi, juan 141, 32:5944–5945.)
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province.23 Third, we journey south from Zhigu直沽 near Tianjin to the mouth of
the Yangtze River. Finally, we start at the mouth of the Liao River and reach Liujia-
gang at the mouth of the Yangtze River.24 Of the four routes introduced by Luo, the
second and fourth connected the Yangtze delta region with the Liaodong peninsula
and were almost identical except for the direction in which they are described. Con-
sidering that the other two routes, one from Fujian to Shandong and the other from
Tianjin to the Yangtze delta region, are not paired with ones in the opposite direc-
tion, it may be plausible to suggest that the sea lane between Liaodong and the
Yangtze delta region held particular importance in sea transport at the time of
Luo’s writing, and perhaps also in Mao’s mind.25 But, similar to his section on
river transport, Mao did not offer extended commentary. We are left to speculate
on how Mao gauged the value of Luo’s maps and descriptions of the four sea
routes in light of the military challenges that the Ming faced in Liaodong at the
beginning of the seventeenth century.
OVERLAND TRANSPORT (LUYUN 陸運)
In stark contrast to his reliance on earlier texts in the sections on river and sea trans-
port, Mao Yuanyi asserted himself more forcibly in his assessment of overland trans-
port methods. Whenever he consulted the past literature on military matters in the
Records of Military Preparedness, Mao carefully distinguished quoted passages
FIG. 2. Map of ports accompanying the text on sea transport in Mao’s Records of Military
Preparedness (continued). This map also views China’s southeastern coast from the east, with
the north facing the right of the page. It depicts Nanjing and the Yangtze River on the right
and Fuzhou on the left of the page. (Mao Yuanyi, Wubeizhi, juan 141, 32:5946–5947.)
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from his own writing. While little commentary is included in the sections on river
and sea transport, all of the three sections on overland transport contain Mao’s
detailed analysis. In addition, Mao entirely omitted descriptions of overland
routes across the Ming realm. Had he wished to include them, the wide availability
of route books during the late Ming period would certainly have made the task feas-
ible.26 Similarly, for reasons that are not clear, he chose not to include maps of over-
land transport routes. Instead, Mao solely focused on carefully analyzing the merits
and costs of overland transport methods. Perhaps reflected in this contrast is the
likelihood that Mao had acquired greater familiarity with the overland transport
of provisions, in comparison to his experience of—or interest in—water transport.
Despite their relative brevity, the sections on overland transport in the Records of
Military Preparedness meticulously address technical and practical concerns, such
as costs, capacity, efficiency, and reliability. Mao’s assessment of overland transport
methods, therefore, allows us to take a close look at the military transport of pro-
visions during the late Ming period.
Cart Transport (cheyun 車運)
Mao’s analysis of overland transport consists of three sections, with each corre-
sponding to cart, mounted, and human transport. “Cart transport is an ancient
principle (zhi 制),” wrote Mao as he opened his section on cart transport. “Its
method ( fa 法) has long been neglected and cannot be examined,” he added,
“and as for examining its purposes, we can only examine [what goes on]
today.”27 This opening passage is immediately followed by his assessment of four
types of cart transport that were presumably in use at the time of his writing.
Also provided are numerical figures indicating how heavy a load each mode of
transport could transport. The first was what he termed the “human-cart”
(renche 人車), which was driven and controlled by carters. Two persons pulled
and pushed the cart, and it could transport a load of up to four bushels (shi 石,
approx. 414 ℓ). Unfortunately, Mao’s description of the hand-held cart is not
accompanied by any illustrations. But his contemporary Song Yingxing 宋應星
(1587–ca. 1666) in his Exploitation of the Works of Nature (Tiangong kaiwu 天
工開物) provided commentary on the single-wheeled cart with illustrations.28
Song noted that this so-called “single-wheeled push-cart (dutuiche 獨推車) of the
south can be managed by the strength of a single person. It can carry a load of
two bushels (207 ℓ). It must stop whenever it encounters a pit on the ground.
The farthest it can travel is merely 100 li (58 km).”29 Judging from the difference
in the volume of load, Song’s single-wheeled push-barrow was likely smaller than
Mao’s hand-held cart, which required the labor of two persons. Nevertheless,
Song’s illustration and description provide vivid pictorial images of late Ming
carts, which Mao might have observed in his native Zhejiang province, or in the
Liaodong region (see Figure 3).
The second type of cart that Mao discussed in the Records of Military Prepared-
ness was the “ox-cart” (niuche 牛車). The ox-cart was powered by two oxen, and
two persons controlled the movement of the oxen and the cart. This type of cart,
according to Mao, could carry a load of up to twelve bushels (1.2 kℓ), three times
as much as the human-cart driven by two people.30 Thirdly, Mao wrote that the
“mule-cart” (luoche 騾車) was led by a team of ten mules and could carry a load
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of up to thirty bushels (3.1 kℓ). In relative terms, the mule-cart could carry more than
twice as much load as the ox-cart, and over seven times as much as the human-cart.
The mule-cart, however, was clearly not Mao’s preferred method. From the point of
view of cost efficiency, he was clearly of the view that the mule-cart did not offer any
advantage over the other types of cart. While Mao did not explain in detail, he
emphasized that “its costs are incalculable.”31
The fourth and final type of cart transport, according to Mao’s categorization,
was the so-called “supply-cart” (zizhongche 錙重車). As Mao explained in the
Records of Military Preparedness, the invention of the supply-cart is normally
attributed to the Ming military commander Qi Jiguang 戚繼光 (1528–1588), who
helped rebuild theMing defenses in both south and north China. The functional pur-
poses of the supply-cart were twofold. Tactically, its wooden structure could provide
cover for soldiers on the battlefield; logistically, it could transport a significant
volume of supplies and provisions for armies deployed away from urban centers
or sites of agricultural production. According to Qi’s original design, a team of
FIG. 3. Left, a single-wheeled cart pushed by one person employed in the south; right, a
single-wheeled cart pushed by one person and drawn by two donkeys. (Song Yingxing, Tian-
gong kaiwu, 2:42–43.)
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eight mules drew each wagon, and eighty supply carts formed a division (ying 營)
(see Figure 4). On top of the cart was placed a large single-sided shield (pianxiangpai
偏廂牌), which “resembled a city wall when seen from a distance.”32 Qi added that
his “supply-cart” could transport twelve and a half bushels (1.3 kℓ) of grain, beans,
and preservable food, slightly exceeding the capacity of Mao’s ox-cart. Thus, one
division of supply-carts could transport a combined load of 1,000 bushels
(104 kℓ) of food, which was deemed sufficient to feed 10,000 men and horses for
three days.
On balance, Mao Yuanyi concluded that the ox-cart was preferable to all the
others as far as cart transport was concerned. As he drew such a conclusion, he
found an encouraging support in the Classic of Changes (Yijing 易經), one of
China’s most canonical texts. “The ancient saying goes,” wrote Mao referring to a
passage in the Classic of Changes, “horses are used to reach a distant place, while
oxen are used to transport a heavy load. Thus, oxen are the basis of cart trans-
port.”33 Unfortunately for our analysis, he did not address the question of how
widely each cart device was being used for military or other purposes. Nor did he
discuss climatic or terrain conditions under which each type of cart could and
could not function as designed.
FIG. 4. A mule-led “supply-cart” depicted in Qi Jiguang’s Practical Account of Military Drill
(Lianbing shiji). The caption reads: “Each cart weighs about 2,000 catties (approx.
1,194 kg).” While the harnesses of the five mules in the front are not connected to the
mules in the rear in this illustration, Qi Jiguang wrote in the accompanying passage that
that a team of eight mules led a cart loaded with military provisions and supplies. In
another section of the text, Qi noted that each cart was led by ten mules, as depicted in this
illustration. (Qi Jiguang, Lianbing shiji, juan 1, 19:111; Lianbing shiji, Zaji, juan 6,
19:732–733.)
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Mounted Transport (qiyun 騎運)
Turning to the next mode of overland transport, Mao focused his attention on the
method involving three members of the horse family: horses, mules, and donkeys.
Although Mao did not explicitly explain how those draft animals differed from
those employed for cart transport, the very distinction that Mao drew between
cart and mounted transport implies that these were pack animals, which carried
heavy loads either on their backs or on pack saddles. Of the three sections concern-
ing overland transport in the Records of Military Preparedness, the one on mounted
transport is the shortest, merely consisting of three lines. Moreover, Mao’s commen-
tary makes it evident that he considered mounted transport to be both costly and
inefficient. “There are three types of mounts,” noted Mao as he explained how
they differed from one another in terms of the volume of load they could carry.
“Horses and mules are capable of carrying up to one and a half bushels (155 ℓ),
while donkeys are capable of carrying up to one bushel (104 ℓ).”34 Compared
with the four types of cart transport that Mao discussed, namely the human-cart,
ox-cart, mule-cart, and supply-cart, the volume of load which pack animals could
carry indeed appear relatively small. According to Mao’s own estimates, even the
smallest of the four—the hand-held cart driven by two carters—could transport a
load of up to four bushels (414 ℓ), nearly three times as much as a pack horse.
In addition, in order to be able to reliably travel a long distance with loads, every
mount had to be fed with an adequate amount of fodder each day. Sources indicate
that during the Ming period cavalry horses were provided with a daily average of
three pints (sheng 升) (3.1 ℓ) of beans and one bundle of grass, weighing about
fifteen catties ( jin 斤) (9 kg).35 Without adding further commentary on mounted
transport, Mao then almost bluntly stated that “while the costs are considerable,
the load that can be transported is small. This is not a fine method. [Only] when
there is no alternative should this method be used.”36 Interestingly, Mao closed
this section on mounted transport by noting that “camels of the northwestern fron-
tiers are capable of fulfilling the duties of several horses.”37 No mention is made of
whether he had personally seen camels transporting heavier loads. According to a
memorial submitted by a Vice Minister of Revenue in 1619, however, the then Gov-
ernor of Liaodong appears to have proposed employing camels to transport pro-
visions, for “a camel can carry three times as much load as a horse or donkey but
eats no more than a horse or donkey.”38 Mao was perhaps aware of such a discus-
sion among Liaodong officials and might have considered the use of camels in the
overland transport of provisions in the region. But purchasing or hiring a sufficient
number of camels perhaps proved difficult. Mao concluded that camels could not
become a viable alternative to horses because “they cannot be obtained in large
numbers.”39
Human Transport (renyun 人運)
The last of the three modes of overland transport examined by Mao Yuanyi
employed neither the principles of mechanical engineering nor the physical
stamina of pack animals. It solely relied on human labor. Of all the three
methods, Mao clearly favored this method of transport. Well versed in literature
on military matters, Mao was keenly aware that there existed in China a historical
precedent for transporting military supplies and provisions by coordinating the
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work of human bearers. He found such an example in the biography of the Yuan-
dynasty general Dong Tuanxiao 董摶霄 (d. 1358) in the Standard History of the
Yuan Dynasty (Yuanshi元史). Included in Dong’s biography is the following propo-
sal that he presented to the Yuan court in 1356, when widespread insurgencies were
seriously undermining the Yuan emperor Shundi’s順帝 claim to power. The matter
in question was the transport of provisions in the strategically vital region of
Huai-Hai 淮海, where the Huai River met the Yellow River in central China.
Among the key localities in the region was the coastal prefecture of Haining 海寧,
located to the east of Xuzhou徐州:
In the area around Haining Prefecture, boats cannot pass, and military pro-
visions can only be transported overland. But the people of the entire
Huai-Hai region have suffered from repeated banditry, and we should
provide comfort. For the time being, soldiers should be ordered to transport
provisions.40
Dong’s primary objective was to transport provisions in the lowlands of today’s
Jiangsu province. But he assessed that water transport was not an option, and ban-
ditry had already depleted the resources of the local communities. In this context,
Dong proposed employing the following method of transport, making the most of
the readily available labor of his soldiers:
If everyone walks ten paces (16 m), then thirty-six people can cover the dis-
tance of one li (576 m). 360 people can cover ten li (5.8 km), and 3,600
people can cover 100 li (58 km). Everyone carries four pecks (dou 斗) (41 ℓ)
of husked grain (mi 米) in a lined cloth sack, which is sealed and marked
with a seal. People do not rest their shoulders, nor does husked grain touch
the ground. People are lined up so that they form a straight line. Everyone
walks 500 laps and a total of twenty-eight li (16 km) a day. [In other
words,] everyone walks fourteen li (8 km) with a load and another fourteen
li without, and we can transport a total of 200 bushels (21 kℓ) of husked
grain a day. If a pint (1 ℓ) of husked grain is distributed [per person], we can
provide for 20,000 people. This is the procedure (shu術) of transporting pro-
visions over 100 li a day.41
In the Records of Military Preparedness, Mao only quoted this latter portion of
Dong’s proposal, which detailed his method of transport relying on human labor.
Mao quietly left out the first portion of the passage, where Dong succinctly
explained the geographical and socio-political context of his proposal.
As we have seen above, Dong’s biography in the Standard History of the Yuan
Dynasty illuminates the two central premises of his transport method. First, enlisting
the labor of local residents in the Huai-Hai region would further aggravate their suffer-
ing caused by banditry and social disorder. Second, in place of local residents, 3,600 sol-
diers were available and could be assigned the task of carrying provisions as bearers
amidst growing threat posed by rebel forces in the region. Mao was likely aware of
these premises of Dong’s memorial as he wrote elsewhere that soldiers not assigned
to combat duty would be an ideal source of labor for the purpose of transporting pro-
visions.42 In his discussion of human transport in theRecords ofMilitary Preparedness,
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however, Mao did not address the issue of labor availability, at least explicitly. Instead,
he focused on the technical aspect of Dong’s proposal. Without specifying who were to
serve as bearers, he went on to suggest a modification toDong’s design and argued that
the bearers should be able to substantially increase their workload:
According to [Dong] Tuanxiao’s method, thirty-six people were assigned to
each li, and everyone was responsible for ten paces. If they walked 500 laps
a day, that meant that everyone walked fourteen li with a load and another
fourteen liwithout. Even the least strong should be able to double the distance.
According to [Dong] Tuanxiao’s method, each sack contained four pecks
(41 ℓ) of husked grain. If we consider its weight, it does not exceed fifty
catties (30 kg). Even the least strong among the men should be able to
double the volume of his load.43
On the one hand, Mao appears to have acknowledged the overall validity and effec-
tiveness of Dong’s approach. On the other hand, he clearly felt that Dong did not
optimize the use of men’s physical resilience. Thus, he suggested that all bearers
should be able to increase their workload fourfold.44 Still, this was not the sole
modification of Dong’s method that Mao put forward (see Figure 5).
Perhaps perceiving that the scale of the military threat that theMing faced in Liao-
dong was different from Dong’s challenges in the Huai-Hai region centuries earlier,
Mao further multiplied Dong’s figures of bearers by a factor of five. That is to say,
FIG. 5. The page explaining Mao’s method of human transport in the Records of Military
Preparedness. Note emphasis marks in the shape of water drops on the right-hand side of the
text. (Mao Yuanyi, Wubeizhi, juan 141, 32:5955–5956.)
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five teams of thirty-six bearers, or a total of 180 bearers, formed five separate
straight lines in each li to transport provisions. Mao explained, “if we assign 180
bearers to each li, we can transport 4,000 bushels (414 kℓ) a day.”45 With thirty-six
bearers assigned to every li, Dong’s original method enabled the transport of 200
bushels (21 kℓ) a day. With 180 bearers assigned to every li, therefore, the total
volume of transported grain would increase fivefold to 1,000 bushels (104 kℓ).
Then, if all bearers could double both the distance that they walked and the
volume of grain that they carried, the total volume would further increase four-
fold—at least in theory—to 4,000 bushels a day.
In the Records of Military Preparedness, Mao did not directly discuss the practic-
ability of his method of human transport. As shown in the introduction of this
study, however, sources suggest that the method of human transport had indeed
been implemented for military transport in the late Ming period. In the case of the
Ming official in charge of logistics during the Japanese invasion of Korea at the end
of the sixteenth century, for example, he was instructed to position 200 soldiers
unfit for combat every ten li—or twenty soldiers every li—over a distance of 500 li
(288 km) for the purpose of transporting provisions and supplies.46 Twenty men
assigned to each li were even fewer than thirty-six men assigned to each li under
Dong Tuanxiao’s method. Perhaps such an adjustment was oftentimes necessitated
by the realities of war and a lack of human labor in wartime society. As far as we
can judge from Mao’s writings, he appears to have firmly believed that he would
be able to transport 4,000 bushels of grain a day by assigning 180 men to each li,
five times as many as under Dong’s method, and nine times as many as under the
method indicated in the case above during the Japanese invasion of Korea.
In the passages that followed, Mao further elaborated on his method of human
transport and underscored its advantages over the other transport methods. He cal-
culated the costs of implementing his method of transport and provided the follow-
ing estimates:
If we pay each person two pints (2 ℓ) of husked grain and have him eat a half
for himself and provide for his family with the rest, the daily expenses for each
li is merely three bushels and six pecks (362 ℓ). If we make groups for meals,
three cooks can feed [those assigned to] each li. Thus, a transport over 100 li
(58 km) only requires the labor of 18,304 people.47
To our eyes, the task of enlisting the willing cooperation of over 18,000 individuals
may seem extremely challenging. Mao, however, undoubtedly considered this
number to be relatively small. Inserting the particle “only” (er 耳) twice into the
passage, he stressed the relative smallness of the figures both in terms of the total
wages and in terms of the number of laborers necessary in order to implement his
method of transport. With all things considered, Mao concluded that “this is the
most convenient aspect of human transport.”48
A CASE FOR HUMAN TRANSPORT
For Mao Yuanyi, who personally participated in the Ming war against the Jurchen
armies in Liaodong in the early seventeenth century, the transport of provisions was
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not merely a matter of intellectual exercise. He presented a forceful argument in
favor of human transport at a time when Nurhaci’s consolidation of power in Liao-
dong was gathering momentum at the expense of the Ming hold over the region.
Especially in the aftermath of the crushing defeat of the Ming at Sarhu in 1619,49
deciding on the manner in which supplies and provisions should reach the encamp-
ments of Ming troops likely assumed renewed importance. Mao might have felt that
any decision on the method of transport could potentially translate into the crucial
difference between victory and defeat on the front lines.
In the Records of Military Preparedness, however, Mao presented his case for
human transport in a rather general form, perhaps in part because he sought to
broaden the appeal of his magnum opus. To take one example, Mao did not link
his assessment of various transport methods to any specific geographical regions.
Mao’s choice to leave out the first portion of Dong Tuanxiao’s proposal further
adds to the impression that he intentionally removed regional references from his
section on human transport in the Records of Military Preparedness. Consequently,
Mao’s case for human transport leaves the reader searching for further context as to
why he considered human transport to be the most efficient means of wartime trans-
port, compared with all the other methods considered in the Records of Military
Preparedness.
As if to address such concern on the part of the reader, Mao provided a more
thorough discussion of human transport in one of his collected essays titled
Daring to Speak (Maoyan冒言). In his own preface to the collection, Mao explained
that he had completed the essays in 1618 in his mid-twenties, well before he partici-
pated in the Ming war in the Liaodong region.50 Although it remains difficult to
determine whether these essays preceded or followed his writing of the Records of
Military Preparedness, the first two essays—one on military colony farming and
the other on human transport—specifically address the military situation and chal-
lenges in the Liaodong region.51 This indicates that the Liaodong region had long
held a prominent place in Mao’s thinking about military transport and logistics.
DURATION AND WAGES
In Daring to Speak, Mao’s essay detailing the method of human transport is simply
titled “Human Transport” (renyun人運). In examining this essay, we quickly realize
that Mao’s method of human transport was clearly intended for the Ming war
against the Jurchen in the Liaodong region. As in the Records of Military Prepared-
ness, Mao also chose to begin his discussion by introducing the method proposed by
the Yuan general Dong Tuanxiao. But what clearly distinguishes this essay from the
Records of Military Preparedness is that Mao carefully took note of the critical
difference between Dong’s challenges in the low-lying plains in today’s Jiangsu pro-
vince and those of the Ming across the vast mountainous terrain of Liaodong at the
beginning of the seventeenth century. Almost dismissing Dong’s method as outdated,
Mao in this essay introduced his subject matter in a forthright manner:
The method of human transport has been in existence since ancient times.
According to historical records, it was started by Dong Tuanxiao, a man of
the Yuan period. However, if we wish to implement his method today, it is cer-
tainly bound to fail. What Dong Tuanxiao proposed was to transport
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[provisions] in Haining. Few men were involved, and the distance was short.
He used soldiers to transport military [provisions] and simply fulfilled what
was needed.52
In contrast to the Records of Military Preparedness, Mao in this essay immediately
highlighted the limitations of Dong’s method. With the ongoing conflict in the Liao-
dong region in mind, Mao indicated that Dong’s plan—covering the distance of 100
li with 3,600 bearers—was an appropriate measure under Dong’s specific circum-
stances. But it was not a method that could be applied directly to his challenges at
the beginning of the seventeenth century.
Mao responded to his challenges in Liaodong by devising his own method of
transport based on the foundation laid by Dong some two and a half centuries
earlier:
The method [of transporting provisions] in Dongning Circuit [of Liaodong]
has yet to be implemented uniformly. Now, if we focus on the two Circuits dis-
cussed by the Military Commissioner ( jinglüe經略), there is a distance of 240
li (138 km) to Liaohai 遼海 Circuit and 210 li (121 km) to Hai-Gai 海盖
Circuit.53 The Military Commissioner has mentioned that there would be
an annual need of 1,120,000 bushels (115,920 kℓ) of husked grain and
beans, and that the costs would total 588,750 taels [of silver]. We have yet
to encounter the following problems: carts breaking down, oxen collapsing,
and sacks being swapped. If these problems were to occur, nothing would
be better than proposing human transport.54
WhileMao in this essay does not appear to have directly leveled criticism at theMili-
tary Commissioner, his writing makes plainly evident how much the two men dis-
agreed over how best to transport military supplies and provisions in Liaodong.
According to a letter that Mao wrote to a friend in 1621, the Military Commissioner
had taken a position in favor of employing ox-carts in Liaodong. Mao explained
that each ox-cart required a team of two oxen and two carters to operate,
perhaps resembling one of the cart vehicles depicted in Song Yingxing’s Exploitation
of the Works of Nature (see Figure 3, right). Mao, on the other hand, did not share
the Military Commissioner’s favorable views on the ox-cart. He firmly held that cart
transport was both costly and inefficient.
For Mao, the immediate logistical challenge was to transport provisions over a
combined distance of 450 li in the area under the jurisdiction of Liaohai and
Hai-Gai Circuits in Liaodong.55 Before detailing his own method, Mao once
again briefly explained the basic ideas of Dong’s human transport: thirty-six
bearers were assigned to each li, and everyone walked twenty-eight li a day to trans-
port a total load of 200 bushels. As we have seen above, Mao argued that bearers
could increase their workload fourfold. In other words, while Dong called for a
transport of 200 bushels a day, Mao expected each line of bearers to transport a
total of 800 bushels (83 kℓ) a day. With five teams of thirty-six bearers assigned
to each li, therefore, Mao’s method theoretically enabled a daily transport of
4,000 bushels (414 kℓ). In term of the volume of load that could be transported,
this was where Mao left the reader in the Records of Military Preparedness
without providing additional variables.
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Between Mao’s discussions of human transport in the Records of Military Prepa-
redness and Daring to Speak, one of the notable differences is that he addressed the
issue of time and duration in his essay inDaring to Speak. Mao was clearly respond-
ing to logistical challenges not merely in the short term, but also in the long term.
Over the course of a year, which consisted of roughly 354 days according to the
lunar calendar, or about 384 days when there was an intercalary month, Mao
expected the transport of provisions in the Liaodong region to continue for 280
days, or nine and a half months. At the rate of 4,000 bushels of grain per day,
this meant that the transport of 1,120,000 bushels (115,920 kℓ) of grain was poss-
ible annually. Mao did not explain how he arrived at the expected duration of 280
days for the transport of military provisions. Nor did he specify whether he expected
the bearers to work continuously for 280 days, or with days of rest in between.
Perhaps Mao had in mind the ancient passage about dividing the four seasons for
farming and military training, which he cited in his section on military colony
farming in the Records of Military Preparedness. The passage indicated that in
ancient times people farmed for three seasons in a year and learned military skills
for one season. Scholars have long understood this passage to mean that while the
three seasons of spring, summer, and autumn were apt for farming, the winter
months permitted people to spend time away from the fields and hone their military
skills. Mao might have borrowed this framework of dividing a year into two groups
and envisioned three seasons, or roughly 280 days, of military transport. He might
have also assessed that the transport of provisions was possible only for 280 days
due to icy climatic conditions in Liaodong’s winter, or that one million bushels of
grain transported over 280 days was sufficient to provision the Ming soldiers sta-
tioned in the region for the entire year. Mao’s text also remains silent as to how
he expected the bearers to spend the remainder of the year. One thing that is clear
from his writings, however, is that he did not expect the bearers to receive wages
when they were not transporting provisions.
As far as wages were concerned, Mao calculated that two pints (2.1 ℓ) of husked
grain was needed daily for each bearer. Based on this assumption, the costs of trans-
porting provisions over the distance of 450 li with the labor of 81,000 bearers—or
180 bearers in each li—totaled 1,620 bushels (160 kℓ) of husked grain a day and
453,600 bushels (44,770 kℓ) over 280 days.56 Mao further argued that his
method of transport could also be applied to transporting grass fodder for a
shorter duration of 227 days. He noted that one bundle of grass weighed fifteen
catties (9 kg) and that each person should be able to take seven bundles at a time.
This meant that everyone was expected to walk ten paces with a total load of 105
catties (63 kg). If we assume that one could enlist the labor of the same number of
bearers over a distance of 450 li—81,000 in total—as for the transport of grain,
this method would have enabled the transport of nearly eight million bundles of
grass fodder over 227 days. As in the transport of grain, each bearer was to
receive a daily wage of two pints (2.1 ℓ) of husked grain, and Mao expected the
total expenses to be 367,540 bushels (36,276 kℓ) of husked grain.57
SOCIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF HUMAN TRANSPORT
Apart from its geographical focus on Liaodong and consideration of duration,
Mao’s essay in Daring to Speak also differs from the Records of Military
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Preparedness in that it considered the resulting effects of human transport on the
region’s economy. Noting that “the people of the Liao region must eat millet (su
粟) of the Liao region,”58 Mao wrote that if Ming armies transported their own
provisions using the method of human transport, they would be able to reduce
the likelihood of disrupting the balance of supply and demand in local grain
markets:
Now, if officials send out 450,000 [bushels of grain], it means that 450,000
bushels will remain among the people. Should there be an additional supply
of 450,000 bushels, we will certainly be able to purchase grain at fair
prices. We would not need 300,000 taels; there would be no use for carts or
oxen. The only inevitable item would be cloth sacks.59
Rounding down the figure of 453,600 bushels that could be transported over 280
days, Mao argued that his method of human transport would not only enable a
reliable transport of provisions, but also help stabilize local grain prices in the Liao-
dong region. As a positive consequence, according toMao, stable grain prices would
also guarantee that, when necessary, officials would be able to locally procure grain
at fair prices.
At the same time, Mao was probably aware that his method of human transport
posed inherent risks. By design, human transport required a substantial number of
hired hands, and preventing fraud among the bearers was a serious challenge. In his
essay, Mao repeatedly underscored the need to securely seal every cloth sack, pre-
sumably in an effort to thwart attempts of deception on the part of the bearers.
He did not describe the exact ways in which bearers could swap sacks in secret
for personal gains. The practice of “swapping sacks” (yidai易袋), however, is men-
tioned twice in this relatively brief essay. It may indicate that actual cases of fraud
had indeed alerted Mao to the risk of losing grain in transit. Perhaps he felt that dis-
honesty among the bearers could seriously derail the Ming effort to provision its sol-
diers in Liaodong, and that preventative measures had to be put in place. Mao likely
knew, however, that completely rooting out fraudulent practices was extremely dif-
ficult, if not impossible. 81,000 bearers, spaced ten paces apart over the distance of
450 li, could not constantly come under the watchful eyes of officials, some of whom
might have also chosen to collude with bearers. Mao could only hope that clearly
marking every sack with an official seal would dissuade the bearers from cheating.
“If the sacks are marked and sealed securely and reach the granaries where they
should be unloaded,” noted Mao, “we can prevent the evil practice of swapping
sacks.”60
We also know that Mao was paying attention to the Sino-Korean borderland, for
he discussed the ground conditions of Kuandian寬奠 and Aiyang靉陽 Forts (bao
堡) on the western bank of the Yalu River (see Figure 6).61 The strategic importance
of the two forts was soon to assume added importance as the Jurchen gained
control of the area and began to seriously challenge the defenses of both the
Ming and the Chosŏn. According to the Chosŏn official Kim Sŏkchu 金錫胄
(1634–1684), who strongly advocated an anti-Manchu position at the Chosŏn
court during the reigns of King Hyŏnjong 顯宗 (r. 1659–1674) and Sukchong 肅
宗 (r. 1674–1720), Kuandian and Aiyang Forts were located opposite from
Ch’angsŏng 昌城 and Pyŏktong 碧潼 on the Chosŏn side of the border and
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could become bases for a military attack against Korea. Kim Sŏkchu also noted that
the terrain in the areas to the south of Ch’angsŏng was relatively less precipitous
than in the surrounding areas, and that the rivers there flowed slowly. For these
reasons, according to Kim, the Chosŏn armies chose to march north through this
region to cross the Yalu River in 1618, on the eve of the Battle of Sarhu. It was
also through this region that Jurchen armies launched their invasion of Korea in
1627, and again in 1636.62 From the point of view of Mao Yuanyi, however,
such relative ease of movement for large armies did not automatically translate
into the ease of movement for provisions. “In the areas surrounding Kuandian
and Aiyang Forts,” he wrote, “we are unable to use the cart. If we were to use
pack horses (matuo 馬馱), the costs would be even greater. If we employ human
labor, we will need no horses.”63 By emphasizing that the terrain of the border
region along the Yalu River made the use of the cart practically unsuitable, Mao
provided—conveniently for his argument—yet another reason to adopt his
method of human transport.
FIG. 6. Map of Ming Liaodong. This map was created by Nung-yao Lin.
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THE EFFICIENCY AND RELIABILITY OF HUMAN TRANSPORT
Mao Yuanyi’s writings suggest that there existed strong support for the use of carts
amongMing officials at the time of the war against the Jurchen. Mao clearly felt that
he had to persuade such advocates of cart transport of the advantages of using
human labor. In the final section of his essay on human transport in Daring to
Speak, he mounted a stout defense of his method of human transport, most likely
aimed at the cautious critics of the method:
Those who caution against human transport merely question whether there
will be a sufficient number of people. What they do not know is that a propo-
sal has been made to hire 30,000 carters [for cart transport], not including
public and private petty laborers (zayi 雜役) who cut grass or feed oxen.
Now, [under the method of human transport] we will only need 81,000
bearers over the vast expanse of the two Circuits [of Liaohai and Hai-Gai].
If we separate the bearers into groups and provide meals, and if three cooks
feed those assigned to each li, in total just over 1,000 petty laborers would
be needed. Why should we worry that people will be insufficient in number?64
Mao maintained that human transport would be far less costly than cart transport.
Assuming that each cart required the labor of two oxen and two carters, hiring
30,000 carters essentially entailed hiring 15,000 carts and 30,000 oxen. In Mao’s
reasoning, if one considered the daily expenses of feeding the oxen, providing for
the carters, and performing routine maintenance of the carts, no one could choose
cart transport over human transport.
With respect to the challenge of enlisting the labor of a significant number of bearers,
Mao’s apparent optimism might have derived in part from the expectation that a large
portion of the garrisoned soldiers in Liaodong, such as Liaoyang遼陽 and Guangning
廣寧, could be reassigned to transport duties.65 At the same time, Mao made an econ-
omic argument that his wage structure had greater appeal than the one proposed by the
proponents of cart transport. Even in the absence of military labor, Mao would likely
have remained confident that local residents in Liaodong would willingly provide their
labor for wages. According to Mao, his critics proposed to hire carters by offering
three-hundredths of a silver tael (1 g) per person a day. Over the course of a year,
the carters were expected to work and receive wages for eight months, slightly
shorter than under Mao’s method of human transport. Thus, each carter would
have earned nine-tenths of a tael (34 g) of silver a month and seven taels and two
maces (267 g) by the end of the eighth month.66 At the time, a peck of grain (10 ℓ)
was valued at one mace and seven-hundredths of a tael (6 g). Based on this price,
the annual wage of seven taels and two maces would have allowed one to purchase
forty-two pecks and three pints (439 ℓ) of grain, or an average of less than two pints
a day. Under Mao’s method, on the other hand, each person received a daily wage
of two pints (2 ℓ) of grain, which amounted to six pecks (62 ℓ) over a month. Since
Mao expected the transport of provisions to continue for 280 days, the total annual
wage in kind totaled fifty-six pecks (580 ℓ) of grain. When compared to the forty-two
pecks of grain that the carters could have purchased with their wages, the economic
advantage of his method appeared obvious to Mao. “In my humble opinion,” asserted
Mao, “the people of the Liao region will willingly come forward.”67
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Finally, perhaps reflecting his concern that such an economic argument alone
might not be sufficiently compelling, Mao highlighted the adaptability of the
human body to a wide range of working and climatic conditions. “Humans differ
from carts or oxen,” noted Mao, “in that they can work shifts, and that we are
able to rotate them. They can work throughout the year without interruption,
stopped only by heavy rain or snow. Such days [of heavy rain or snow] do not
exceed thirty days a year.”68 For officials in the Ming civil and military adminis-
tration, such a line of argument likely proved most effective as their performance
was subject to constant scrutiny by peers and censorial officials. In Mao’s view,
not only could humans carry heavy loads and walk long distances at a relatively
low cost, they could also provide crucial reliability for military transport under
testing conditions. As Mao pointed out earlier in the essay, carts could break
down, and pack animals could collapse while transporting provisions. In stark con-
trast, according to Mao, the human body had proven remarkably resilient. Admit-
tedly, the same humans could also commit fraud by swapping sacks. Mao must have
reasoned, however, that the overall majority of the bearers were obedient and
dutiful. Curiously left out of his argument is the likelihood that humans could
also collapse while transporting provisions, succumbing to illnesses, injuries, or
exhaustion. If Mao considered the fragility of the human body, he in the end
chose not to address the matter in his writings. As we come to the closing passages
of Mao’s essay on human transport inDaring to Speak, we cannot help but wonder
about the human toll of his method of transporting provisions in wartime Liaodong
in the early seventeenth century, and about the intriguing interplay between technol-
ogy, efficiency, and reliability in the mind of the erudite late Ming scholar.
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Han Myŏnggi 韓明基 and Yi Sanghun 李相薰. 11 vols. Chinju: Kungnip chinju pang-
mulgwan, 2003.
Shen, Gua (Kuo) 沈括. Mengxi bitan 夢溪筆談 (Brush Talks from a Dream Brook). 2 vols.
Yangzhou: Jiangsu Guangling guji keyinshe, 1997.
Song, Lian宋濂 et al., comps. Yuanshi元史 (Standard History of the Yuan Dynasty). 15 vols.
Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1976.
Song, Yingxing 宋應星. Tiangong kaiwu 天工開物 (Exploitation of the Works of Nature)
(1637). 3 vols. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959.
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